Vertical integration in a stochastic framework and a nonsymmetric bargaining equilibrium by Rossini, Gianpaolo
Vertical integration in a stochastic framework
and a nonsymmetric bargaining equilibrium1
Gianpaolo Rossini
Department of Economics, University of Bologna
Strada Maggiore, 45, I-40125 Bologna, Italy
Fax ++39.051.2092664, Ph. ++39.051.2092607
rossini@spbo.unibo.it
November 1, 2004
1Paper presented at the Joint Hamburg-Siena Workshop on ”Collective choice,
evolutionary games, and institutional economics” 11-14, June 2004, Sylt, Germany
and at the 2004 Asset Annual Conference in Barcelona, 4-6 November. I bene…ted
from many invaluable comments, in particular from Manfred Holler, Luca Lamber-
tini, Moshé Machover and Michele Moretto. I gratefully acknowledge the …nancial
support of the University of Bologna under the 60% scheme for the year 2004 and
the …nancial support of the Italian Ministry of Education within the 40% scheme
for the year 2004.
Abstract
We go through the decision to vertically integrate or outsource in an uncer-
tain framework. We consider two di¤erent market strategies, price setting
and quantity setting and two di¤erent vertical relationships: a Stackelberg
one and a bargaining one. In the …rst scenario, with certainty, price and
quantity settings are alike, while with uncertainty the ranking changes. If
the bargaining framework is adopted instead, quantity setting under uncer-
tainty leads to an asymmetric distribution of realized gains along the vertical
chain.
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1 Introduction
Vertical integration (VI) and its contrary, i.e. outsourcing (OS), have be-
come quite a hot issue in both literature (see for instance recent contribu-
tions of Antràs and Helpman (2004), Grossman and Helpman (2002)) and
policy discussions. OS has become a relevant phenomenon nowadays both
within national areas and crossborder. The decision concerning the vertical
arrangement to adopt, OS or VI, is a strategic choice that occurs in di¤erent
market environments. As most choices of this kind, is a¤ected by several
externalities.
Two of them are quite common and worth mentioning.
The …rst concerns the act of going VI or OS by a …rm. This action gener-
ates a negative or positive externality to other rivals according to whether it
leads to a more or less competitive market altering the pro…tability of going
OS or VI for subsequent …rms (McLaren, 1999, 2000).
The second is an inner externality regarding the vertical relationship be-
tween a downstream (D) …rm manufacturing a …nal good and an upstream
(U) …rm producing an intermediate good that enters the …nal product. As al-
ready pointed out in the literature (Spengler, 1950; Williamson, 1971; Tirole,
1988; Perry, 1989), OS is subject to the ”double marginalization” shortcom-
ing, i.e.: when the price of the …nal good increases the pro…t of the U …rm
decreases. This externality arises in all market structures but perfect compe-
tition. As a result VI turns out to be superior from both a private and a social
point of view. There are however some circumstances, related to either dif-
ferent objectives of …rms (Rossini, 2003), or di¤erentiation (Lambertini and
Rossini, 2003; Pepall and Norman, 2001) or market strategic substitutability
(Buehler and Schmutzler, 2003) where this externality is neutralized or even
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reversed.
Empirically the question of the private and social superiority of VI vis à
vis OS has been analyzed by Slade (1998a, b) who casts doubts on some past
stances of antitrust agencies.
Further externalities in vertical relationships are related to R&D. Theo-
retical analyses have been provided in Rossini and Lambertini (2003), Brocas
(2003), Banerjee and Lin (2001), among others, while empirical investiga-
tions date back to fundamental contributions of Teece (1976) and Armour
and Teece (1981) all the way through more recent investigations, such as
Nemoto and Goto (2004). R&D vertical spillovers may add a new source
of external bene…ts to either vertical arrangement according to which one is
thought to be more spillover prone.
Going back to the second externality it seems that it is canceled by adopt-
ing a particular vertical relationship. The one that gives rise to the external-
ity is a Stackelberg - like link between a U (leader) and a D (follower). As
an alternative it may be adopted a cooperative approach by assuming that
U and D bargain among them. This approach opens the way to the use of
a Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, 1950), in one of its many versions and
re…nements1.
The use of a cooperative approach rather than a Stackelberg solution
concept is quite a matter of judgement. Stackelberg introduces a vertical
asymmetry and is a¤ected by an externality that is swept away if there is VI
due to internalization.
Assuming that …rms bargain along the vertical chain leads to a close
replication of the VI result. In other words …rms symmetrically share the
surplus, as the NBS dictates, mimicking vertical collusion. Hence, the result
1See Rubinstein (1982 ) or, for a good survey, Petrosjan and Zenkevich (1996).
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is quite close to that of a vertical cartel, even though here the distribution
of the joint surplus is not necessarily a symmetric one as with NBS.
Most of these conclusions are taken for granted in an environment in
which there is market certainty. Here we extend the analysis to an uncertain
environment. We shall see that a great deal of di¤erence depends upon which
strategic variable is adopted by the D …rm in both the Stackelberg case and
in the NBS case. In the …rst case we …nd a private superiority of quantity
setting for the D …rm, which extends to the U …rm if nonlinear costs are
common to both stages of the vertical production process.
With bargaining we …nd that in some circumstances the NBS equilib-
rium is no longer symmetric in realized gains and with convex costs price
setting may be either superior or inferior to quantity setting according to the
stochastic scenario and technology parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we go through the cases
of a Stackelberg vertical relationships. In section 3 we provide comparisons
between price and quantity settings. In section 4 we use the NBS. In Section
5 we draw some concluding remarks.
2 Outsourcing with a Stackelberg solution
We now consider a vertical production process of a good that is sold in a
…nal market by a monopoly which needs an intermediate input to produce
it.
The vertical technological relationship is one of perfect vertical comple-
mentarity: i.e. only one unit of the intermediate good enters the production
of one unit of the …nal good.
In terms of the organizational character of the vertical relationship we
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can have either Vertical Integration (VI), whereby only one …rm own both
the D and the U sections of production, or outsourcing (OS) with two distinct
…rms in the D and U sections respectively.
The vertical market relationship can be modeled in at least two di¤erent
modes: a non cooperative Stackelberg solution or a bargaining. We …rst
consider Stackelberg while in the next section we go through the bargaining
solution2.
When we consider a vertical relationship adopting a noncooperative stance
it is immaterial whether the monopolist …rm in the DW section is a price
or a quantity setter. However, the results change when we introduce uncer-
tainty. We know from literature (Leland, 1972; Klemperer and Meyer, 1986;
Lambertini, 2004; Rossini, 1993; Malliaris and Brock, 1982) that market
uncertainty drives a wedge between the pro…ts a monopolist gets according
to whether the decision variable is price or quantity. Here we wish to see
whether the choice of di¤erent controls has an e¤ect also in the case of a
vertical relationship.
We then consider the general framework.
With price setting, the demand function for the …nal good is uncertain
and linear in price (p), the size of the market (a) and a shock term (e):
q = (a¡ p+ e)=b (1)
where b stands for the slope of the demand function and q is the quantity
sold. We assume that the additive shock term has zero expected value and
constant second moment, i.e.:
Ee = 0; Ee2 = ¾2; (2)
2To de…ne a bargaining as a market solution is a bit imprecise since competition is
quite far from bargaining which is, on the contrary, very close to collusion.
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where E is the expectation operator.
In case of quantity setting the uncertain market demand is:
p = a¡ bq + e: (3)
As far as the technology is concerned we adopt the same approach of Klem-
perer and Meyer (1986) for the D stage of production, while we keep linear
technology for the U stage. Then total cost (C) in the D stage is a quadratic
function of quantity with c and d technological parameters:
C = cq ¡ dq2: (4)
In the U stage we assume that production has to bear a constant marginal
cost z and that the intermediate input is sold to the D …rm at a price g:
2.1 Price setting
The pro…t function of the D monopolist is:
¼D = pq ¡ cq ¡ dq2 ¡ gq: (5)
We take the expected value and derive it with respect to the market price to
…nd a maximum3 from which we get the set price, which is a nonstochastic
magnitude:
#E¼D
#p
= 0 =) pS = a(b+ 2d) + b(c+ g)
2(b+ d)
: (6)
Once we substitute pS in the demand function we obtain the stochastic
quantity that we plug in the pro…t of the U …rm:
¼U = gq ¡ zq: (7)
3Second order conditions (SOCs) are satis…ed for the chosen p. In the subsequent parts
of the paper we shall not mention SOCs unless they impose restrictions on the solutions.
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Then we take the expected value of ¼U and maximize it with respect to g:
Setting it equal to zero we get the FOC and the price set in the U stage, i.e.:
#E¼U
#g
= 0 =) g = 1
2
(a¡ c+ z) : (8)
As a result the optimal endogenous quantity is:
q¤ =
ab+ 4de¡ b(c¡ 4e+ z)
4b(b+ d)
: (9)
We are then able to …nd the equilibrium expected pro…ts of the two …rms.
De…ning A = a¡ c¡ z; for the D …rm we have:
E¼¤DP =
A2
16(b+ d)
¡ d
b2
Ee2 = ¼¤DP ¡
d
b2
Ee2: (10)
We see that the expected pro…t is lower than the corresponding certainty
pro…t (¼¤DP ):
For the U …rm we have:
E¼¤UP =
A2
8(b+ d)
= ¼¤UP (11)
which is equal to the corresponding certainty pro…t (¼¤UP ). The above argu-
ments lead to the following
Proposition 1 With price setting and Stackelberg mode of behavior along
the vertical chain in an uncertain market framework the expected value of the
pro…t of U is equal to the certainty pro…t, while that of D is lower for any
…nite level of the variance of the stochastic shock e: The higher is the degree
of convexity of D costs and the lower the slope of the demand the larger is
the premium paid to uncertainty by D pro…ts.
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2.2 Quantity setting
We now go through the quantity setting framework. In this case the demand
for the …nal good is:
p = a¡ bq + e: (12)
Then the pro…t of the D …rm is:
¼D = pq ¡ cq ¡ dq2 ¡ gq: (13)
If we take the FOC of expected pro…t with respect to the quantity we get:
#E¼D
#q
= 0 =) qS = a¡ c¡ g
2(b+ d)
; (14)
where the set quantity is a nonstocahstic magnitude.
The pro…t of the U …rm is:
¼U = gq ¡ zq: (15)
Following a similar procedure as in the previous subsection we get the price
set by the U …rm:
#¼U
#g
= 0 =) gS = a¡ c+ z
2
: (16)
from which we get the quantity sold:
q¤ =
A
4(b+ d)
: (17)
The …nal stochastic price is:
p = a+ e+
b(¡A)
4(b+ d)
(18)
The pro…t of U is nonstochastic since U takes from D the quantity set which
is nonstochastic. Therefore:
¼¤UQ =
A2
8(b+ d)
= E¼¤UP (19)
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while the realized pro…t of D is:
¼R¤DQ =
A(A+ 4e)
16(b+ d)
(20)
whose expected value is equal to
E¼¤DQ =
A2
16(b+ d)
= ¼¤DQ (21)
which is equal to the corresponding certainty level.
We are then able to write:
Proposition 2 The comparison of price with quantity setting in the …nal
stage of the vertical chain establishes that quantity setting is superior for the
D …rm since its expected pro…ts are higher in an uncertain environment with
quantity rather than with price setting. For the U …rm there is indi¤erence
since Q and P setting lead to the same expected pro…t for U. The D …rm
gains from a positive shock, while the U …rm does not.
2.3 Non linear costs in U
A further comparison can be undertaken if we adopt non linear costs also in
the U stage, i.e.:
CU = zq + wq
2: (22)
In that case we get that, with price setting expected pro…ts of D are:
E¼DP =
"
A2(b+ d)
4(2b+ 2d+ w)2
¡ dEe
2
b2
#
: (23)
While for U we have
E¼UP =
"
A2
4(2b+ 2d+ w)
¡ wEe
2
b2
#
: (24)
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If we go through the quantity setting expected pro…ts we see that they are
equal to the certainty pro…ts, despite non linear costs.
Then we may write the following
Corollary 1 If we adopt non linear costs in both stages also the expected pro…ts of
the U …rm are a¤ected by the variance of the shock. Both …rms in U
and D su¤er in a way that depends on their respective cost parameters
w and d.
3 Vertical integration: comparison between
quantity and price setting
Here we go through the case of VI for both price and quantity settings, using
the same demand functions and the same U and D technologies. The pro…t
of the VI monopoly is:
¼V I = pq ¡ cq ¡ dq2 ¡ zq (25)
since the intermediate good is internally transferred at its opportunity cost
equal to the marginal cost of production, i.e. z:
In the price setting case we get:
#E¼V IP
#p
= 0 =) pS = b(a+ c+ z) + 2ad
2(b+ d)
: (26)
We take p and get the optimal quantity
q¤ =
A
2(b+ d)
+
e
b
: (27)
Therefore the expected value of pro…t is
E¼V IP =
A2
4(b+ d)
¡ Ee2 d
b2
(28)
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Turning to quantity setting we get:
#E¼V IQ
#q
= 0 =) qS = A
2(b+ d)
: (29)
Substituting qS in the demand function we get
p = a+ e¡ Ab
2(b+ d)
(30)
and the optimal pro…t:
¼V IQ =
A(A+ 2e)
4(b+ d)
: (31)
Whose expected value is
E¼V IQ =
A2
4(b+ d)
(32)
and is equal to the certainty outcome.
Immediate comparison between the two settings leads to:
E¼V IQ ¡E¼V IP = Ee2 d
b2
;
Then we can write the following
Proposition 3 With vertical integration and market uncertainty expected
pro…ts are higher with quantity setting rather than with price setting (This
result closely replicates Klemperer and Mayer, 1986).
Consider now non linear costs also in the U stage.
With price setting we have:
E¼V IP =
A2
4(b+ d+ w)
¡ d+ w
b2
Ee2 = ¼V IP ¡ d+ w
b2
Ee2:
With quantity setting we get:
E¼V IQ =
A2
4(b+ d+ w)
= ¼V IQ:
In words: when costs are non linear in U and D, the loss due to market
uncertainty in terms of pro…ts is the same no matter whether we have vertical
integration or outsourcing.
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4 Vertical bargaining
A very common way to model vertical relationships is via a bargaining be-
tween the U and D …rm. This arrangement is mostly set in the framework
of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its re…nements (Nash, 1950; Petrosjan
and Zenkevich, 1996; Rubinstein, 1982). With certainty the bargaining solu-
tion gives rise to aggregate pro…ts equal to those of VI. Their distribution is
perfectly symmetric among the two …rms as the bargaining solution dictates.
Here we con…ne to vertical bargaining solutions in two scenarios parallel-
ing the above sections, i.e.: price setting and quantity setting.
Demand structure is the same as above. As far as technologies are con-
cerned we consider the same as above, linear and nonlinear. Finally we
assume that outside options are equal to zero.
QUANTITY SETTING
We replicate the demand in (3). Then we have to specify the features of
the bargaining in the uncertain setting. We design the decision procedure
as one whereby both the D …rm and the U …rm maximize their expected
pro…t. As a result the bargaining requires the maximization of the geometric
average of expected D and U pro…t. This assumption is extended to the price
setting case below.
Since
¼DQ = q(p¡ c¡ g) = q(a+ e¡ bq)¡ q(c+ g) (33)
we have that
E¼DQ = q(a¡ bq)¡ q(c+ g):
Moreover
E¼UQ = q(g ¡ z): (34)
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The bargaining objective is:
rQ = E¼UQ E¼DQ (35)
that has to be maximized with respect to the controls of the two rivals.
We then go through the two simultaneous FOCs:8><>:
@rQ
@q
= 0
@rQ
@g
= 0
9>=>; : (36)
From this we get
q =
A
2b
; (37)
where a¡ c¡ z = A; and
g =
1
4
(a¡ c + 3z): (38)
Therefore we have:
p =
1
2
(a+ c+ z + 2e): (39)
Then, we get:
¼UQ =
1
8b
A2 = E¼UQ (40)
and
¼DQ =
A
8b
(A+ 4e): (41)
To sum up we see that:
E¼DQ =
A2
8b
= E¼UQ: (42)
Yet if we compare the realizations of pro…ts we get:
¼DQ ¡ ¼UQ = A
2b
e: (43)
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This implies that, with quantity setting we get a symmetric distribution of
expected pro…ts along the vertical chain. However their realization is not.
In particular, if the shock is positive pro…ts will be greater in D while if it is
negative U will be better o¤.
This is quite an important result. First it has an asymmetric content
despite the symmetric bargaining. Second it may explain the di¤erent in-
centives to vertically integrate of the D section vis à vis the U section in the
downturn and in the upturn of the business cycle. With vertical integration
we may in fact …gure out that each …rm gets exactly one half of the whole
pro…t which is A
2
4b
:
PRICE SETTING
We adopt the same sequence of decisions as above. Therefore the maxi-
mand of the bargaining is made again of E¼DP and E¼UP . We shall have:8><>:
@rP
@p
= 0
@rP
@g
= 0
9>=>; (44)
from which we get the FOCs as:
p =
A
2
(45)
and
g =
A
4
+ z: (46)
Then the endogenous quantity is
q =
A+ 2e
2b
: (47)
Realized pro…ts are equal:
¼UP = ¼DP =
A(A+ 2e)
8b
(48)
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and therefore also
E¼DP = E¼UP : (49)
We are then able to write the following
Proposition 4 With bargaining along the vertical chain and market uncer-
tainty, quantity setting provides a symmetric distribution of expected pro…ts
between U and D, while realizations are not symmetric, showing distinct in-
centives to outsource in the downturn and in the upturn of the business cycle
for the D and the U sections. With price setting the symmetry occurs for both
the expected and the realized pro…ts. In this last case the gain in the realized
pro…ts is equally shared between the two …rms4.
NON LINEAR COSTS
We assume that costs are non linear in both D and U as in the previous
section.
With quantity setting that expected pro…ts are equal between U and D,
yet again their realizations are not:
¼DQ =
A(A+ 4e)
8(b+ d+ w)
while
¼UQ =
A2
8(b+ d+ w)
:
Their respective expected values coincide.
4In the case of linear costs the pro…t with VI and Q setting is equal to that with P
setting in both the realized and expected values:
¼QV I =
A(A+ 2e)
4b
= ¼PV I :
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With price setting we have that realized pro…ts and expected pro…ts are
symmetric. In particular:
E¼UP = E¼DP =
A2
8(b+ d+ w)
¡ Ee2d+ w
2b
+ Ee3
(d¡ w)(b+ d+ w)
Ab3
:
As it can be seen the expected pro…ts su¤er from market uncertainty due
to the variance of the shock. However, if the convexity parameters of the
costs in U and D di¤er (d 6= w) the third moment will enter the picture and
uncertainty could even make expected pro…ts larger than in the certainty
case, provided
¡Ee2d+ w
2b
+ Ee3
(d¡ w)(b+ d+ w)
Ab3
¸ 0:
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5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated the issue of vertical integration and outsourcing in a
stochastic framework by using two di¤erent equilibrium concepts: Stackel-
berg and Nash Bargaining Solution.
With the Stackelberg solution we …nd that price setting in an uncertain
environment is always inferior for the D …rm. If we allow for non linear costs
also in the U stage of production the inferiority extends to the U …rm that
will then prefer the D …rm to set the quantity in the market for the …nal
good rather than the price.
An analogous result can be found when we consider a vertically integrated
monopoly.
A second solution concept, the NBS, has been adopted to model the
interaction among the vertically related …rms. In this case price setting is still
inferior to quantity setting. It provides a symmetric solution in both realized
and expected pro…ts. This solution is equal to an even split of pro…ts of
vertical integration. With quantity setting we have a non symmetric result
for the realized pro…ts. If there is a positive demand shock the D …rm is
better o¤ than the U …rm. The opposite happens in the downturn, providing
di¤erent incentives to integrate or to outsource of D and U over the business
cycle. If we introduce non linear costs in both stages of production we …nd
that quantity setting replicates the closely the outcome with linear costs.
With price setting …rms are worse o¤ than with quantity setting as far as their
expected pro…ts are concerned if costs have the same convexity parameters.
If they di¤er (d 6= w) uncertainty may increase or decrease expected pro…ts.
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